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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000017

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [MOPS](#)  
SUBJECT: P3 AGREE TO PRESSURE CHINA ON UNAMID COOPERATION

REF: USUN 1221

Classified By: Ambassador Jackie Wolcott for Reasons 1.4 B/D.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: AMB Wolcott and USUN poloffs convened a P3 meeting on January 4 to discuss next steps on Darfur. AMB Wolcott delivered the U.S. message on the need to persuade China to intervene with Khartoum regarding cooperation with UNAMID deployment. UKUN AMB John Sawers said that the P3 should begin working together "towards a credible threat" of sanctions. The French Africa expert put forward his government's proposal for a series of meetings on Darfur as means of building diplomatic momentum. The P3 agreed to coordinate a message of "growing impatience with Khartoum" to China and Russia in mid-January. END SUMMARY.

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AMB Wolcott Pushes for Coordinated  
Approach with China on Darfur  
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¶2. (C) AMB Wolcott told the P3 that the U.S. was interested in coordinating increased diplomatic pressure to convince the Chinese to intervene with the Government of the Sudan (GOS) regarding non-cooperation with UNAMID deployment. Currently, the Chinese Mission assesses that they do not need to press the Sudanese harder on issues related to UNAMID deployment, as evidenced by their intransigence on basic procedural issues related to upcoming discussions on Darfur. (NOTE: The Security Council spent hours over the course of three separate discussions to reach consensus on the format of the January 9 meeting on UNAMID -- a public briefing by the Secretariat followed by closed consultations. END NOTE.)

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¶3. (C) AMB Wolcott said the P3 need to work together to pressure the Chinese to be more helpful. Otherwise, the status quo will continue and UNAMID will fail. She said the U.S. is open to ideas that would pressure the Chinese -- a tough PRST, a threat of sanctions in the P5 context, or a resolution listing current areas of non-cooperation that if not addressed by GOS would result in further measures.

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UKUN Urges Careful, Deliberate  
Preparation of Sanctions Threat  
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¶4. (C) UKUN AMB Sawers concurred that the status quo is unacceptable and that persuading China to intervene was the key element of any strategy aimed at changing Sudanese behavior. Sawers cautioned against a PRST as unlikely to produce any substantive outcome in the context of continued

Security Council disagreement on Darfur. On sanctions, Sawers concurred that a credible threat could force the Chinese to act, "The Chinese won't vote for it and don't want to veto it, which leaves them no option but to intervene with their friends in Khartoum." Sawers assessed that China would work hard to avoid a diplomatically embarrassing veto on Darfur sanctions in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics. For this reason a credible threat of sanctions, by itself, could spur the Chinese to be more helpful with the GOS.

15. (C) Sawers added that a credible threat would require time and careful diplomatic preparation. Likewise, the UK is conscious of the timing of such a threat since FCO Minister of State Mark Malloch Brown is scheduled to visit Khartoum sometime in January. Sawer's offered UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown's upcoming visit to Beijing as an opportunity for the UK to deliver a bilateral message to the Chinese on Darfur.

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France Proposes UN/AU  
Meetings  
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16. (C) Africa Expert Clement LeClerc said France shared the U.S. analysis that pressure on Beijing was the key element of any strategy to attain Sudanese cooperation. (NOTE: AMB Jean-Maurice Ripert was absent from the meeting. END NOTE.) LeClerc repeated the French proposal for a UN/AU meeting in New York to be followed by a meeting in Addis Ababa with the AU, Sudan, Secretariat, P5, TCCs and regional actors (November 2006 format). LeClerc argued that these meeting could build diplomatic steam towards a credible threat of sanctions.

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UKUN to Host Meeting on  
UNAMID Shortfalls  
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17. (C) AMB Sawers said UKUN plans to host a January 16 meeting in New York to solicit TCCs to contribute the missing helicopters and transportation assets. Sawers said the UK approach is to break the components of the missing military assets into discrete elements -- helicopters, crews, maintenance, etc -- with the goal of finding donor countries for the individual components. This approach might provide a means for moving forward on the contracting arrangements described in the UKUN paper (reftel).

18. (C) AMB Wolcott said the U.S. would assist with this approach and offered the additional idea of transferring helicopters from an existing peacekeeping mission. Sawers concurred that an inter-mission transfer was an excellent idea and noted that UNMIN (Nepal) was a helicopter heavy mission that could be targeted.

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Next Steps  
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19. (C) The P3 agreed to coordinate diplomatic pressure on the Chinese during the coming weeks. As a first step, AMB Sawers said UKUN would ask DPKO to prepare a paper for distribution to the Security Council detailing ongoing impediments to UNAMID deployment. This paper will establish metrics for Council discussion of Sudanese non-compliance. The P3 also agreed to deliver a strong message regarding the unacceptability of the status quo during the January 9 UNAMID discussion. Lastly, the P3 agreed to hold a P5 meeting January 17 or 18 to deliver a message of "growing impatience with Khartoum" to China and Russia.

